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Introduction 
 
With the growing number of actors and institutions involved in com-
plex peacebuilding, there is also a growing demand for more unified 
and joint approaches to planning, implementation and learning. In UN 
peacebuilding missions, the integrated approach concept involves a 
mission design where the planning and coordination processes of the 
various elements of the UN family are integrated into a single coun-
try-level UN system.1 NATO uses the term comprehensive approach 
for similar concept.  
 
These approaches have been embraced by some, and strongly opposed 
by others. The first optimistic ambitions that military, political, devel-
opment and humanitarian elements of all international intervention 
would become integrated in joint strategies, planning processes and 
implementation have been replaced by somewhat more realistic ap-
proaches. There has been gradual recognition that joint planning and 
implementation is highly complicated, and that the independence of 
the diverse organisations and institutions must be taken into account.2  
NATO and its members now refer more to the need for coordination 
of the diverse international actors than to integration of efforts. 
 
This article argues that joint evaluations can be one tool useful for im-
proving the coordination of very diverse actors. It examines some ex-
periences of joint evaluations and learning processes undertaken 
mainly in the humanitarian domain, where valuable lessons have been 
learned over the past 15 years.  
 
The international humanitarian community can be relevant as a point 
of departure, for several reasons:  
 
 Humanitarian action is usually conducted in volatile, conflic-
tive and unpredictable settings. 
 Many diverse actors are involved, including donor countries, 
UN agencies, Red Cross/Red Crescent, NGOs, researchers, 
private contractors and recipient countries. 
                                                 
1  Cedric de Coning, ‘Implications of a Comprehensive or Integrated Approach for 
Training in United Nations and African Union Peace Operations.’ NUPI, Oslo 
2009. 
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 Cooperation and coordination mechanisms for policy devel-
opment, planning and operational activities have been devel-
oped, and rest on the fundamental premise that actors and 
agencies are independent and their participation is entirely 
voluntary.  
 The development of common policies and standards is self-
regulatory, rather than imposed through any ‘command’ sys-
tem. 
 
This report examines the following specific cases: the joint donor 
evaluation of Rwanda (1995–96), the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 
(TEC) 2005–2006 and the Inter-agency Real-time evaluation of Dar-
fur (2004–2005).  
 
These evaluations differed in their institutional frameworks and man-
agement arrangements, as well as to timing in relation to the outset of 
the crisis. On the other hand, they also shared some common features: 
they were all system-wide, as they included a broad range of actors 
and themes, and they all became references for joint evaluation poli-
cies and practices. Moreover, the evaluations dealt with crises that, 
because of the large-scale human suffering involved, had generated 
public interest and solidarity globally.  
 
The report examines how challenges of management and organisation 
of the evaluations were solved, when such different and diverse inde-
pendent actors set out to have joint learning processes. It looks at how 
the evaluations were initiated, what the purpose and objectives were 
and how they were managed.  It will also see what main lessons and 
recommendations emerged from the evaluations, how these were fol-
lowed up, and if any change or impact can be traced.  
Some general lessons and experiences will then be extracted, in the 
hope that they may prove relevant also for future joint military and 
civilian learning exercises.  
Why joint evaluations?  
As defined by the OECD, an evaluation is  
 
an assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of an on-going 
or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation 
and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of 
objectives, developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sus-
tainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible 
and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the deci-
sion-making process of both recipients and donors.
3
  
 
Evaluation is usually an inherent element in the planning and learning 
cycle – a good evaluation depends on there being well-defined goals 
and objectives in the planning process. It is intended to feed into fur-
ther planning of projects and programmes, but also to support further 
policy development.  
 
Joint evaluations have been used quite extensively in the development 
domain, particularly by bilateral donors. The OECD has indicated that 
the benefits of joint evaluations, as compared to single-agency evalua-
tions, could include:4  
 
– they provide mutual capacity development, as agencies and or-
ganisations can learn from each other, and share evaluation 
techniques; 
– harmonisation – joint evaluations can limit the number of 
evaluation messages and foster consensus on upcoming priori-
ties in a given country or setting; 
–  they have the potential to enable participation of developing 
country institutions (in the recipient country);  
– they can increase objectivity and legitimacy – and not least – 
transparency;  
– joint evaluations can address broader evaluation questions and 
can facilitate a perspective on multi-agency impacts beyond the 
results of one individual agency.  
                                                 
3  DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance. Development Assis-
tance Committee. OECD, Paris, 1991,  
4  OECD (2006), Guidance for Managing Joint Evaluations. DAC Evaluation Se-
ries.  
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The Joint Evaluation of the Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda shook the world. Within a few months, 
between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were sys-
tematically massacred.5 The international community response – or 
lack of response – was seriously criticised. The failure to prevent or 
halt the mass killings, despite the presence of a UN Peacekeeping 
Force, gave rise to questions about the capabilities of international 
conflict management. Also questioned were the performance and effi-
ciency of the humanitarian agencies involved in the massive humani-
tarian operation in the aftermath of the genocide.  
 
The idea of a system-wide evaluation was first launched by Danida in 
the OECD DAC setting, where it met some initial resistance. How-
ever, with the support of internal and external organisations, the idea 
gained momentum, and the process soon evolved to include a large 
number of different actors. In addition to the 19 OECD member coun-
tries, the core of the evaluation management consisted of representa-
tives from EU, the DAC secretariat of the OECD, ICRC, IFRC, nine 
multilateral organisations (UN, IOM etc) and five NGO organisa-
tions/consortia.6 
 
The objective of the evaluation was to: 
 
draw lessons from the Rwanda experience relevant for future com-
plex emergencies as well as for current operations in Rwanda and 
the region, such as early warning and conflict management, the 
preparation for and provision of emergency assistance, and the tran-
sition from relief to rehabilitation and development.’.
7
  
 
Four studies were commissioned: Study I –  Historical Perspective, 
Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management, Study III: Hu-
manitarian Aid and Effects, and Study IV: Rebuilding Post-Genocide 
Rwanda. 
                                                 
5  The exact number has never been established. This estimate was used by the 
Joint Evaluation, others argue that it was higher. See Human Rights Watch for a 
discussion of several estimates.  
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-04.htm 6  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, the USA; the Commission of the EU, OECD/DAC secre-
tariat, IOM, UN/DHA, UNDP, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHP, WHO, 
IBRD, ICRC, IFRC, ICVA, Doctors of the World, INTERACTION, Steering 
Committee for Humanitarian Response, VOICE. (France suspended its participa-
tion in December 1995.)  
7  John Ericsson, ‘The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons 
from the Rwanda Experience. Synthesis Report’. Steering Committee of the 
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Copenhagen, 1996.  
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Evaluation management 
A thorough management structure was set in place. A Steering Com-
mittee, made up of ‘interested members of the international aid com-
munity’, met four times.8 Its main tasks were to finalise the Terms of 
Reference (ToR) and approve the short list of evaluators, approve 
budget and funding and discuss and provide feedback on study re-
ports, approve outlines and later the draft of the synthesis report. The 
Steering Committee was also in charge of presenting the final report 
to the international community. 
 
In addition, each study was managed by a lead donor agency (I Swe-
den, II Norway, III UK, IV USA). These four lead agencies, with 
Denmark in the chair, constituted a management group that was to 
contract, assign and supervise the work of  the consultants and institu-
tions in charge of the studies. In addition to the formal management 
structure, the evaluation also made use of consultations with experts. 
A group of resource persons, selected because of their expertise and 
experience, was invited to read and comment on presentations and 
drafts. 
 
The original intention had been to engage Africans in the evaluation. 
However, no representatives from African civil society or governmen-
tal institutions were included in the formal management structures. 
Instead, a panel of seven experts from Africa provided a critique of 
the report through participation in two panel discussions with the au-
thors of the reports and selected resource persons.  
 
Implementation and scope 
The scale of the evaluation process was unprecedented. In all, 52 re-
searchers and consultants were employed on the five studies, and the 
cost of the whole process was USD 1.7 million. Study 3 – on humani-
tarian aid – cost USD 580,000 and had a team of 20 specialists and 
support staff with a combined input of four person-years.  
 
The evaluation teams had several field visits to Rwanda and the Afri-
can Great Lakes Region, as well as visits to UN Headquarters in New 
York and Washington DC, Paris and Brussels.  
 
To ensure cross-fertilization and joint analysis, several workshops 
were held in the course of the year that the evaluation lasted, where 
the various evaluation teams met and discussed preliminary findings 
and analytical approaches.  
                                                 
8  John Borton and John Eriksson, ‘Lessons from Rwanda – Lessons for Today: 
Assessment of the Impact and Influence of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency 
Assistance to Rwanda.’  Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). The Interna-
tional Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experi-
ence.  
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Given the sensitive nature of the crisis, the evaluators did encounter 
some resistance when undertaking data collection and when present-
ing their preliminary findings. UNDPKO was initially very reluctant 
to acknowledge that they had received early warning on the genocide 
from the Force Commander of UNAMIR, the peacekeeping force, and 
did not allow access to the files.9 UNHCR became involved in a dis-
pute with the evaluation team (Study II) on the findings and conclu-
sions on its performance. The French Ministry of Defence was reluc-
tant to disclose its policies and activities in Rwanda, and France later 
withdrew from the steering committee of the evaluation because of the 
criticism of the French involvement. 
 
Main lessons emerging from the evaluation 
The evaluation listed 24 main findings, each with a set of correspond-
ing recommendations.  According to the Former Chairman of the 
Steering Committee for the evaluation, these findings can be summa-
rized in the following main lessons:10  
 
1.  Unwillingness to acknowledge that genocide was happening pre-
vented action to stop it. 
2.  In view of the scale of suffering, the humanitarian aid was im-
pressive, but could have been better prepared, better coordinated 
and more cost-effective. 
3.  Inadequate and slow support for reconstruction of the Rwandese 
society and government, including the justice system, has delayed 
a return to normalcy. 
 
The evaluation highlighted severe systemic weaknesses in the interna-
tional community, with a prime focus on lack of policy coherence. 
The evaluation pointed to the fact that policy and strategy formulation 
had failed to take political/diplomatic, humanitarian, military/peace-
keeping and development aspects into account in an integrated matter. 
The conflicting interests among Security Council members, the dis-
crepancies between the UN Secretariat and the Security Council, as 
well as inadequate communication within the various functions of the 
UN Secretariat all contributed to this lack of coherence.  
 
The evaluation also recommended that the main international actors, 
including the main bodies of the UN, the OAU and the member states, 
should take measures to effectively prevent and suppress genocide and 
to include protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations.  
 
On the humanitarian side, the evaluation stressed that responsibility 
                                                 
 9  The author supported the Study II evaluation team, and participated in the data 
collection in New York and Paris.  
10  Nils Dabelstein, preface in Borton and Eriksson (2004). 
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for inadequate systems for contingency planning and preparedness 
measures had to be shared between donors and operational agencies, 
and it offered several recommendations to increase funding and con-
crete measures for improving preparedness. The performance of the 
numerous NGOs involved was found to be of mixed quality. While 
some acted with professionalism and delivered high-quality assis-
tance, others acted unprofessionally and irresponsibly.  
 
Follow-up of implementation 
The steering group decided to have a follow-up review of the recom-
mendations after six months. At its meeting in November 1995, the 
Steering Committee agreed to review the impact of the JEEAR reports 
one year after their publication; and a second process, the Joint 
Evaluation Follow-up, Monitoring and Facilitation Network (JEFF), 
was set up to monitor and report on the evaluation’s 64 recommenda-
tions. JEFF was a small network of 11 individuals representing the 
Management Group, the study teams and the Steering Committee, 
with a part-time secretariat and a modest budget. In the 15 months fol-
lowing publication, JEFF members participated in a total of 73 events. 
The final JEFF report was issued in June 1997, 15 months after the 
publication of the evaluation itself. 
 
Two-thirds of the recommendations were judged to have had at least 
some positive outcomes. Main areas of progress were found to be: the 
strengthening of human rights machinery in Rwanda; the development 
of early-warning information systems in the Great Lakes region; the 
broadly supported efforts within the NGO community to improve per-
formance through the development of standards and self-regulation 
mechanisms; and? the commitment shown by donors, UN agencies 
and NGOs to improve accountability within humanitarian aid.11 
However, this first review found that no progress could be detected for 
the following recommendations:  
 Fostering Policy Coherence (directed at the UN Security 
Council, Secretariat and General Assembly)  
 Effective Prevention and Early Suppression of Genocide (di-
rected at the UN Security Council, the Secretaries-General of 
the UN and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
                                                 
11  John Borton, ‘The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda’,  Hu-
manitarian Practice Network, 26, March 2004. 
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Danida, the Danish development agency that had taken the initiative 
to the evaluation in 1995, commissioned a study 10 years after, to as-
sess the influence and impact of the evaluation.12 The study revealed 
that the Joint Evaluation had been highly influential: it had stimulated 
further research and analysis of complex emergencies and the ten-
dency toward genocide, and had been used widely as a teaching re-
source at the college and university levels. It was seen as pioneering, 
as it was the first report to be published that assessed the performance 
of the international community in all phases of the genocide, and be-
cause of its unusually wide scope. A further factor was the inclusive 
governance of the Joint Evaluation, which gave political weight to the 
evaluation. The fact that its Steering Committee included representa-
tions of the same countries and institutions as those to whom the 
evaluation was addressed, increased its credibility.  
 
The most direct impact had been in the area of humanitarian account-
ability. The development of the ‘Sphere Standards’ was a benchmark 
in creating common standards in emergency settings. Although the 
process had been initiated before the evaluation, it is widely recog-
nised that the evaluation gave the then fragile and informal process 
momentum and legitimacy, and helped move the process forward.13  
 
Other more or less direct spin-offs were the Humanitarian Account-
ability Project (HAP) and the creation of ALNAP – The Active Learn-
ing Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Ac-
tion. ALNAP has become a unique network that incorporates most of 
the key humanitarian organisations and experts, including members 
from donors, NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, the UN, independ-
ent experts and research institutions.14  
 
Since the first review of recommendations in 1996, there have been 
important policy changes within the international community concern-
ing prevention of genocide, some of which were only partially cap-
tured by the 2005 assessment. The same year, world leaders agreed 
through the World Summit Outcome Document that each individual 
state has ‘the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
                                                 
12  John Borton and John Eriksson (2004). The Terms of Reference set the purpose 
of the assessment to be four-fold. Using the Joint Evaluation as a basis, the as-
sessment was to: 1) assess the extent to which the evaluation has been acknowl-
edged in subsequent literature and official reports, and by key informants; 2) re-
view developments in the fields/sectors covered by the Joint Evaluation recom-
mendations since publication in 1996; 3) ascertain the degree to which develop-
ments in the different sectors that the Joint Evaluation addressed are consistent 
or inconsistent with Joint Evaluation recommendations. 13  See Margie Buchanan-Smith, How the Sphere Project Came into Being:  A Case 
Study of Policy-Making in the Humanitarian Aid Sector and the Relative Influ-
ence of Research. Working Paper 215. Overseas Development Institute, London 
2003. 14  See www.alnap.org for more information on this network. 
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war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ and that 
this entails the prevention of such crimes.15 
 
However, little progress has been made when it comes to actually pre-
venting or halting genocide. The Darfur tragedy is an example of a 
situation where information was available, political  and public atten-
tion was very high, but where again the international community 
failed to prevent mass killings and provide protection for the civilian 
population.  
The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC):  
Joint evaluation of the international response to the Indian 
Ocean tsunami 
 
The Rwanda joint evaluation has been a reference point for joint 
evaluations of humanitarian response. However, despite the influence 
and impact it had on the humanitarian community, and the growing 
interest for learning and accountability in the humanitarian sector,  it 
took more than 10 years before another large-scale joint evaluation of 
a humanitarian crisis was undertaken.  
 
Only a week after the December 2004 tsunami, several humanitarian 
agencies began to discuss how to coordinate evaluations of the tsu-
nami response, and in February 2005 a consultative inter-agency and 
donor meeting was convened. The agencies were interested in how to 
maximise learning through joint evaluations. Five thematic areas were 
identified for further investigation: coordination, needs assessment, 
the impact of the international response on local and national capaci-
ties, links between relief, rehabilitation and longer-term development, 
and the funding response.16 
 
Management 
A Core Management Group (CMG), consisting of 14 representatives 
from humanitarian and development cooperation agencies, managed 
the strategy and process,  through general oversight and direction for 
the TEC on behalf of its wider membership. The ALNAP secretariat 
provided the platform. For three of the thematic evaluations, multi-
agency Steering Committees were formed to take decisions on such 
matters as  the selection of the evaluation teams, as well as providing 
guidance and advice to the evaluation teams, and signing-off on the 
                                                 
15  UN General Assembly A/RES/60/1 “2005 World Summit Outcome”. 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?Op
enElement 16  J. Telford and J Cosgrave (2006): Joint Evaluation of the international response 
to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report. London: Tsunami Evaluation 
Coalition.  
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final report. As the Steering Committees included operational agen-
cies, the members were also useful in ensuring that field representa-
tives were aware of the TEC, and available to contribute to the evalua-
tions.   
 
Implementation and scope 
The TEC was the largest humanitarian evaluation ever undertaken. 
The total cost was approximately USD 2.9 million, and some 30 inde-
pendent consultants and researchers were contracted for the main 
evaluation teams. The teams conducted field visits of two to three 
weeks to the most affected countries (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand), 
and more than 40 persons participated in additional research studies. 17 
 
Main findings 
One of the main findings of the evaluation concerned the failure of 
international agencies to build on local capacities, even though the 
immediate life-saving support had consistently been provided by 
neighbours, local authorities and other local actors. The evaluation 
also pointed out that the international agencies to a little degree coor-
dinated their response, instead competing for funding in one of the 
best-funded (if not over-funded) crisis responses ever.  
 
The authors of the synthesis report noted that these are systemic 
weaknesses of the humanitarian response system, first identified in the 
Rwanda evaluation.  
 
The four main recommendations from the evaluation were the follow-
ing: 
 
1. The international humanitarian community needs a fundamen-
tal reorientation from supplying aid to supporting and facilitat-
ing communities´ own relief and recovery priorities; 
2. All actors should strive to increase their disaster response ca-
pacities and to improve the linkages and coherence (...) in the 
international disaster response system, including those from 
the affected countries themselves; 
3. The international relief system should establish an accredita-
tion and certification system to distinguish agencies that work 
to a professional standard in a particular sector; and 
                                                 
17  For the funding study alone, more than 30 sub-studies were commissioned for 
each of the main donor countries and main agencies.  
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4. All actors need to make the current funding system impartial, 
and more efficient, flexible, transparent and better aligned with 
principles of good donorship.18  
Follow-up 
In the immediate aftermath of the evaluation, the TEC findings and 
conclusions were extensively discussed in workshops, meetings and 
seminars, mainly within the coordination structures and networks 
(IASC and ALNAP) in which the TEC had originated. The main 
agencies forming the TEC commissioned a follow-up evaluation three 
years after the tsunami, as the conclusions of the reports had indicated 
serious concern that the developmental aims of the response were not 
likely to be achieved.19 The follow-up focused specifically on the 
linkage of relief, rehabilitation and development; and while the first 
evaluation had dealt mainly with process and policy issues, the time 
elapsed since the initial response allowed the follow-up evaluation to 
conclude on results and achievements as well. A new element in the 
management structure was the inclusion of the government agencies 
of the affected countries.20  
                                                 
18  Ibid 19  ‘A ripple in development? Long-term perspectives on the response to the Indian 
Ocean tsunami 2004. A joint follow-up evaluation of the links between relief, 
rehabilitation and development (LRRD)’. Sida 2009. 20  Joint Steering Committee: Sida, Norad, Danida, the Netherlands Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, CIDA, BAPPENAS Indonesia, BRR Indonesia, Ministry for 
Plan Implementation, Sri Lanka. Ministry for National Building, Sri Lanka, 
ISDR, Bangkok, IFRC Bangkok, CARE International, OCHA and UNICEF. 

Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluations 
Real-time evaluations have become increasingly used tools for hu-
manitarian agencies. The UNHCR has been the agency that has most 
consistently made use of such evaluations, and has also developed 
tools and methods that have since been adopted by other agencies.  
 
The recently published guide to real-time evaluations21 defines a real-
time evaluation as ‘an evaluation in which the primary objective is to 
provide feedback in a participatory way in real time (i.e. during the 
evaluation fieldwork) to those executing and managing the humanitar-
ian response’. Real-time evaluations differ from ‘ordinary’ evaluations 
not only in timing and speed, but more importantly in design, that they 
are meant to be interactive, and that they are more directed to opera-
tional managers in the field than the case with other evaluations.  
 
Inter-agency real-time evaluations have begun to be tested out only 
recently. The Darfur real-time evaluation was one of the first, and was 
a valuable learning exercise for what might become a standard feature 
of humanitarian response. There is a growing recognition that timely 
evaluative feedback into ongoing humanitarian operations on issues 
that go beyond single-agency programmes is useful for improving sys-
tem-wide performance. This can offer a unique framework for inter-
agency system-wide evaluation by reviewing the overall direction, co-
ordination and implementation of an emergency response, rather than 
the solely agency-specific aspects, thus offering a view of the broader 
effects at the level of the humanitarian system. Since the Darfur Real-
Time Evaluation (RTE) in 2004/2005, inter-agency RTEs have been 
used in the humanitarian response to the Mozambique floods, the 
Pakistan earthquake response (with a special focus on the cluster ap-
proach) and the drought response in the Horn of Africa. Most recently, 
an RTE was launched to give feedback on the response to the Cyclone 
Nargis (Myanmar).  
The Darfur Real-Time Evaluation 
The inter-agency real-time evaluation of the Darfur crisis (Darfur 
RTE) was commissioned by the Emergency Relief Coordinator in 
August 2004, one year into the crisis, to look into concerns about the 
                                                 
21  John Cosgrave, Ben Ramalingan and Tony Beck (2009) ‘Real-time evaluations 
of humanitarian action. An ALNAP Guide. ODI 2009 (Pilot version).  
www.alnap.org/publications/pdfs/RTEguide.pdf 
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timeliness and effectiveness of relief delivery to the population of 
Darfur, Sudan.  
 
The background was the slow international response to the crisis. It 
had become apparent that huge humanitarian needs were still unmet, 
and the civilian population virtually without any protection of their 
basic rights.22  
 
The objective of the evaluation was twofold:  to recommend actions 
that might be taken to improve the operational response in real time; 
and to identify broader lessons learned in Darfur for future humanitar-
ian action there and elsewhere.23 
 
Four main issues were to be examined:  
 
– leadership and coordination 
– overall operational response for the UN agencies, OCHA and 
NGOs  
– advocacy work of the UN and OCHA 
– donor response.  
The evaluation was to focus on the UN response, but would also ex-
amine the role and performance of NGOs and donors.  
 
Management 
The overall management of the evaluation was left to one lead agency 
– OCHA. Its tasks included responsibility for the conduct of the 
evaluation, assessing the quality of the reports, day-to-day contact 
with the consultants and keeping stakeholders informed.  The inter-
agency aspect was taken care of by establishing  a ‘core learning 
group’ involving key operational IASC members, where both evalua-
tion staff and programme staff participated. 
 
Implementation and scope 
The evaluation was conducted by two independent consultants. To 
ensure learning, the team was also supported by staff from OCHA and 
Care who were not directly involved in the operational response. The 
real-time evaluation was designed in three phases, with three field vis-
its, over a period of ten months. Each visit was followed up with sepa-
                                                 
22  The humanitarian response later developed into one of the most massive humani-
tarian operations ever. 23  The evaluation was to examine the timeliness, coherence, coverage, appropriate-
ness, relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian and protection pro-
vided to the vulnerable population. 
Joint Evaluations and Learning in Complex Emergencies 
 
19 
rate reports.24 The purpose of iterative visits was to enable the team to 
observe responses to the crisis as it unfolded, and feed suggestions for 
immediate course corrections into existing mechanisms and fora.25  
 
Information was collected through interviews with key stakeholders, 
focus groups, surveys, observation and review of background docu-
ments. Participatory workshops were conducted to ensure interactiv-
ity.  
 
Findings and recommendations 
A main finding was that nearly all the agencies and organisations in-
volved were unable to mobilise the appropriate capacity to respond to 
the Darfur crisis. There were also deficiencies in leadership and coor-
dination that could have been improved with deeper UN field pres-
ence, and clearer distribution of roles and responsibilities for critical 
areas. Also highlighted was the lack of accountability for perform-
ance, for both NGOs and UN agencies – this was linked to the absence 
of agreed benchmarks. The evaluation also concluded that an agreed 
framework to protect human rights would have been useful, and that 
more, not less, public advocacy on behalf of the war-affected popula-
tions would have helped to create a more protective environment. 
 
In particular, the RTE recommended improving the accountability of 
headquarters support to the field, extending the UN presence beyond 
state capitals, strengthening sectoral planning at the field level, and 
installing  a strategic planning and analysis unit. The evaluation also 
recommended that a common advocacy platform for the UN be devel-
oped. 
 
Follow-up of recommendations 
To facilitate follow-up of the recommendations, a management re-
sponse matrix was developed. Each of the specific recommendations 
was broken down into action points, with defined responsible focal 
points.   
 
A first lessons-learned workshop was conducted in the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee’s Working Group in March 2006, and OCHA has 
since attempted to track the follow-up of recommendations. The con-
clusion is that there is mixed record of follow-up. While the Darfur 
RTE worked as a catalyst for action on several of the issues, OCHA 
has recognised that most of the recommendations were not acted upon 
in real time. As reasons, they note competing priorities, the sheer 
                                                 
24  A fourth and final report was planned, but was never completed due to illness. 
The main report thus consists of the three sub-reports.  25  Bernard Broughton and Sarah Maguire: ‘Inter-agency Real-Time Evaluation of 
the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis’. OCHA 2006. 
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number of recommendations, a lack of capacity at the field level, and 
institutional insularity.26  
 
Here it should be added that several of the recommendations reflect 
systemic weaknesses in the humanitarian community, and are thus less 
likely to be acted upon promptly by operational staff. Issues like hu-
manitarian leadership, coordination, planning and accountability – all 
central to the findings in the RTE – are main elements of the Humani-
tarian Reform Process launched in 2005 by the Emergency Relief Co-
ordinator. This reform was mainly based on a Humanitarian Response 
review that went parallel to the initial Darfur response. The weak-
nesses found in the review were also noted by the Darfur RTE. In that 
sense, many of the recommendations are indirectly being dealt with 
through the Humanitarian Reform, as various specific measures have 
been put in place to improve humanitarian leadership, cluster planning 
(or sector planning), predictable distribution of responsibilities for re-
sponse and accountability measures. However, the improvements are 
most evident at policy level, and the reform is still in an early imple-
mentation phase.27  
                                                 
26  OCHA Evaluation and Studies Section (ESS), 2006 Report.  27  See http://www.humanitarianreform.org/ for more information on the elements 
of the reform, and status of implementation.  
Lessons from Joint and Inter-Agency 
evaluations  
With the increasing interest in and use of joint and inter-agency 
evaluations has also come a growing realisation that these are complex 
undertakings, and that more knowledge and lessons need to be drawn 
from the experience gained. Within the ALNAP network, several 
workshops and sessions have sought to summarise lessons learnt so 
far, and the IASC has established a specific subgroup for inter-agency 
real-time evaluations. In the following we present some general les-
sons, drawn partly from these lessons-learnt exercises, the cases stud-
ied above, and from the general literature on joint evaluations.  
 
The literature and guidance notes developed to date have been drawn 
mostly from bilateral development support in stable and traditional 
long-term donor–recipient relations. Such generic lessons can never-
theless be of use, as the benefits and challenges are often similar. 
However, it should be noted that the challenges will multiply with the 
number and diversity of the actors; moreover, the interventions and 
programmes to be evaluated will often have been conducted in con-
flict settings marked by considerable unpredictability.   
 
The OECD guidelines for managing joint evaluations highlight the 
need to establish, at an earlier stage, common ground rules for the 
evaluation: ‘It should not be assumed that each of the partners has the 
same objective for the joint evaluation. Experience shows that con-
flicting – and sometimes hidden – agendas often emerge as the evalua-
tion process develops.’28 Agreeing on common ground rules includes 
deciding on who should be involved and how, what purpose and ob-
jectives the evaluation should have, making sure that all stakeholders 
share the main principles and standards for the evaluation, and decid-
ing on sound management structures.  
 
Although the evaluations studied involved a wide range of organisa-
tions and institutions, there were no reports of big discrepancies. The 
stakeholders and the evaluators in the Rwanda evaluation all agreed 
that the performance of some NGOs had been poor, that lives had 
been lost as a result, and that something had to be done to raise the 
quality of humanitarian assistance. In retrospect, the main evaluators 
                                                 
28  OECD (2006).  
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identify this fact as a success factor for the evaluation itself, as well as 
for the impact it was later to have on the humanitarian system.29 
 
The fact that the stakeholders in the Darfur RTE and the Tsunami 
Evaluation shared a common general understanding of what the main 
important issues and the problem areas were facilitated the conduct of 
these evaluations. This does not mean that there was any lack of dis-
cussion and exchange of views, but rather that the parameters for 
analysis were shared, and the standards for judging success, etc., 
broadly the same.  
 
The humanitarian community has come far in harmonising standards 
and overall policies for humanitarian action. Regular meeting points 
and coordination structures have facilitated this. In part, the Rwanda 
evaluation was a main factor in the creation of learning networks like 
ALNAP. This network, and the harmonisation of humanitarian tools, 
principles and standards it has promoted, in turn served to facilitate 
the Darfur evaluation and the TEC. 
 
It should be noted that all of these evaluations, as is the case with most 
evaluations of development and humanitarian work, were based on the 
OECD DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance.30  
 
Agreeing on who should be involved 
Early on in the evaluation, there should be a decision on who should 
be involved. A broad, inclusive approach can create more ownership 
to the evaluation and its findings – and can lead to a higher degree of 
follow-up of recommendations. However, if too many actors are in-
volved, that can lead to management problems and impede progress 
with the evaluation. Additionally, the transaction costs involved in 
joint evaluations can be particularly challenging for smaller organisa-
tions.  
 
The three evaluations studied here were initiated in different ways. 
The Rwanda evaluation came about at the instigation of bilateral do-
nors within the formal OECD DAC framework, with Danida  as the 
primus motor, but it soon involved a range of actors. The Darfur RTE 
was initiated within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, also with a 
set membership but including various actors, and with OCHA as the 
main driving force behind the evaluation. And the TEC had a much 
more ‘democratic’ start, with ‘interested agencies and institutions’, all 
connected within the informal network of ALNAP, setting off the 
                                                 
29  Borton (2004). 30  OECD (1991). Humanitarian agencies also make use of the ALNAP initiated 
guide ‘Evaluating Humanitarian Action using the OECD-DAC Criteria‘ by Tony 
Beck. Final version? March 2008.  
http://www.alnap.org/resources/guides/evaluation/ehadac.aspx 
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evaluation.  However, there is little to indicate that whether the initia-
tive was taken within formal or informal structures has had much im-
pact on the evaluation itself.  
 
The OECD guidance note recommends that  
 
ground rules should clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
each partner and establish clear mechanisms for decision mak-
ing and cost/burden sharing. The evaluation ground rules 
should ensure that the views of the less powerful partners will 
be respected and should define the commitment that all part-
ners will have to the findings and recommendations. 
  
The lessons-learnt exercise held in the IASC setting after the Darfur 
Real-Time Evaluation indicated that not all stakeholders had shared an 
understanding of the value of the evaluation, and the institutional 
commitment to the evaluation varied. It was also indicated that the 
NGOs could have been more involved, to ensure that the application 
and results of the evaluation would benefit not only the UN system but 
NGOs as well. 
 
The TEC was assessed as having been quite successful in involving  
the main stakeholders. There were differing layers of involvement, 
which allowed smaller organisations to be involved in different ways. 
That is a factor to take into account when more diverse actors plan to 
undertake common evaluations – not least in politically controversial 
settings. Diversity in itself is not necessarily a problem, as long as 
there are formal and informal meeting points, shared standards and 
principles, and a shared understanding of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the responses in general.  
 
Equally important is deciding how the various stakeholders should be 
involved: who should be in the lead, who should be deeply involved in 
most steps of the evaluation, and who should generally be kept in-
formed only about major decisions and developments.  
 
Field-level involvement 
Most joint evaluations in the development and humanitarian domains 
have been led by the headquarters of the organisations in question, and 
mainly by their evaluation and monitoring managers and officials. 
When the chief aim is to learn how to improve future policy, a main 
concern will usually be to ensure that top management and policy de-
partments in the various organisations are involved and interested, as 
they will usually be the ones that can ensure follow-up and implemen-
tation of recommendations.  
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With RTEs, however, the main target audience should be operational 
staff and managers – primarily at field level, but also at head offices. 
Communications between head offices and the field proved difficult 
for the Darfur RTE. Several field managers complained that the RTE 
was a top–down affair, and that the main purpose was accountability 
from the field to the head offices, and not learning.31 How to include 
the field level remains a major challenge for all RTEs, particularly in-
ter-agency ones.   
 
Evaluations also involve a burden on the field level, which will need 
to balance the priority of ongoing operational activities with dealing 
with evaluation teams and their need for support. The Tsunami 
Evaluation was not intended to have impact and influence in real time, 
but it was started during the first phase of the response, and field visits 
and interviews were conducted while operations were ongoing. The 
TEC initially struggled with the funding aspect, which delayed the 
contracting of evaluation team leaders, resulting in insufficient lead-
time between team formation and field visits.32 
 
Some resistance was also reported in connection with this evaluation. 
It was held that  some senior agency managers (particularly within the 
UN) were not interested in sharing information for evaluations that 
had not been commissioned directly by the agency itself or their do-
nors.33 
 
Host-country involvement 
Ideally, the host country and the receiving community should be equal 
partners in evaluations. Indeed, for ‘traditional’ joint donor evalua-
tions in developmental contexts, host-country  involvement is a main 
reason for conducting joint evaluations, as it will provide better over-
sight of aid impact for the receiving country.  
 
In conflict and/or humanitarian settings, deciding to involve the host 
country needs thorough discussion and deliberation. If the host gov-
ernment is a party to the conflict – as was the case with the Sudanese 
government in Darfur – direct involvement would easily be counter-
productive.  
 
The Rwanda evaluation and the TEC were carried out in less conflict-
filled settings, where the host countries could have been involved. In 
the evaluation reports and follow-up meetings, the evaluation manag-
                                                 
31  Peta Sandison, ‘The utilisation of evaluations’, Chapter 3 in ALNAP Review of 
Humanitarian Action in 2005. The utilizations of evaluations. ALNAP, 2006. 32  TEC, ‘Lessons Learned from TEC Process’, report from TEC Review Day 14 
February 2006, London. From  
http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/9DBB5423-E2EF-43AB-
B6D2-2F5237342949/0/tec_lessonslearned_ver2_march06_final.pdf  33  Telford and Cosgrave (2006) 
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ers took self-criticism for the failure to involve local actors systemati-
cally in the evaluation processes.  The TEC partly made up for this 
flaw by including the affected governments in the management struc-
ture of the later follow-up evaluation.  
 
Deciding on the main evaluation issues to explore 
The lessons-learnt processes after the Darfur Real Time evaluation 
and the Tsunami Joint Evaluation concluded that both these evalua-
tions could have benefitted from more thorough discussion of which 
main issues to explore.  Many of the stakeholders involved the Darfur 
RET commented that the ToR were too broad, and included too many 
diverse issues.34 Having a large number of issues will inevitably lead 
to a large number of recommendations, which in turn can disperse re-
sponsibilities for follow-up action. For the tsunami evaluation, the 
number of issues was not a problem, but the stakeholders reflected 
later that the issues had been decided somewhat at random, and that a 
more thorough discussion would have advantageous.  
 
The OECD guidance note on joint evaluations stresses the importance 
of holding early discussions while openly acknowledging the motives 
and incentives of the different partners and anticipating possible prob-
lems.35  For broad evaluations, it recommends that an initial scoping, 
options or approach paper be commissioned.  This should explore the 
main issues, challenges and opportunities and provide the basis for an 
informed discussion between all the partners on the overall approach 
to the evaluation.36 Civilian and military actors will often differ in 
their approaches to evaluations and learning, with different methods 
and terminology.37 Such a concept note or approach paper could be 
particularly useful in providing common grounds for the further proc-
ess. If possible, it should also attempt to differentiate between diver-
gent interests and analysis on one hand, and differences in language 
and terminology on the other.  
 
Matching ambitions (purpose and objectives) with resources, de-
sign and scope 
The three evaluations differed in their purpose and scope. While the 
Rwanda and TEC had system-wide learning as the main purpose, the 
Darfur Real-Time Evaluation was intended first and foremost to en-
sure immediate improvements in field performance.  
 
                                                 
34  Sandison (2006). 35  OECD (2006) 36  Ibid. 37  Kristin M.Haugevik and Benjamin de Carvalho: ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in 
Multinational and Interagency Operations’, Discussion Paper on Operational 
Terminologies and Assessment for Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5). 718 
Working Paper, NUPI, Oslo 2007. 
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Moreover, the resources made available for the Rwanda and TEC, in 
terms of person-days spent and budgets, were unprecedented. With 
several million dollars in funding, and some 40 to 50 consultants and 
researchers, they were able to provide in-depth studies on a range of 
issues, and succeeded in providing well-founded recommendations on 
overall policy issues. The inclusion of the main donors in the evalua-
tion management was without doubt a contributing factor to the scope 
of these evaluations. The financial question was by no means an easy 
one, as delays in the provision of financial contributions to the TEC 
delayed the formation of the evaluation teams and thus the fieldwork 
of the teams. 
  
In contrast, the Darfur Real Time evaluation had a small team of two 
external consultants and a correspondingly small budget. Although 
that was a necessity to ensure fast deployment and a lean process, the 
issues to be covered were quite broad, ranging from overall policy is-
sues to fairly technical programmatic problems. That might help to 
explain why there came to be rather poor follow-up of the many rec-
ommendations resulting from the evaluation.  
 
The tendency to overload the evaluation with issues and objectives is 
prominent also in single-agency evaluations, as various sections and 
actors within the organisation may have differing interests and per-
spectives on a programme, and will attempt to throw in questions from 
their own agenda. With joint evaluations, this tendency will only be 
magnified. A rigorous process, at an early stage, of narrowing down 
the main focus, purpose and objective will facilitate the later work. A 
realistic plan for the financing, including the burden sharing among 
the participants, should be part of the initial process.   
 
Accountability or learning? 
Most evaluations have elements of both learning and accountability. 
However, it is important to establish what the main purpose is, as that 
will influence further evaluation choices, and not least the various ac-
tors´ follow-up of the evaluation.  
 
Accountability is about transparency in how resources have been used, 
and what results and (possibly) impacts have been achieved. Whereas 
accountability has more to do with the past, learning needs to be more 
forward-looking, aimed at producing some sort of change – at pro-
gramme level, organisational or institutional level, even at system 
level.  
 
In a survey of participating agencies in the TEC, the majority cited 
‘learning’ (for improved performance) as their main rationale for tak-
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ing part in the joint evaluation, while accountability came fifth.38 Most 
humanitarian agencies will also need to have a very detailed evalua-
tion of their own programme outputs and results, for purposes of ac-
countability. A system-wide evaluation will usually not provide such 
level of detail.  
 
For joint evaluations involving both military and civilian actors, it 
would be particularly advantageous to put the emphasis on learning. 
The accountability element should focus on transparency to the af-
fected communities and states, seeking to explain what has been 
achieved by the many foreign interventions, rather than to home con-
stituencies – who are usually more concerned about how effectively 
taxpayers´ money has been used. 
 
Agreeing on a clear management structure 
The Rwanda evaluation was a very ambitious undertaking, in terms of 
the number of issues, the controversy surrounding the crisis, and the 
number of stakeholders and consultants involved. The clear, transpar-
ent and inclusive management structure has been highlighted as one of 
the main factors that enabled the report to be finalised in the course of 
one year. The Rwanda evaluation model of having one small man-
agement group with a broader steering committee was repeated for the 
tsunami evaluation, which was also assessed as having worked very 
well.  
 
The Rwanda evaluation and the tsunami evaluation are comparable in 
management structure and in process design. The decision to divide 
the main tsunami evaluation into sub-themes, with separate evaluation 
teams and corresponding steering groups, proved to work well in the 
view of most stakeholders, including the evaluators.39 The committees 
that were set up to follow each of the sub-evaluations provided direc-
tion to the evaluation teams and functioned as quality assurance, in 
addition to serving as a link to the field organisations.   
 
If an evaluation is divided into sub-studies, meeting points should be 
created between the various evaluation teams to ensure cross-
fertilization. This was seen as a strength of both the Rwanda evalua-
tion teams and the TEC teams, who were able to meet to discuss with 
each other, as well as with policy-makers, evaluation managers and 
independent experts.  
 
Another important lesson for the system-wide evaluation is the need to 
have full-time secretariats to coordinate research, information flows 
                                                 
38  Report on joint evaluations, ALNAP 39  ALNAP Workshop report on TEC (ALNAP Biannual meeting, Rome, December 
2006) 
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and administrative issues. For the TEC, the decision to delegate these 
functions to the ALNAP secretariat was assessed to be a success fac-
tor for implementation of the evaluation.  
 
Such elaborate structures would not be suitable for real-time evalua-
tions, however. As their purpose is to adjust and improve ongoing 
programmes and activities, they need a lean management structure 
that can allow swift decision-making to ensure progress. The inter-
agency RTEs have tended to have one lead agency to take care of day-
to-day management, while inter-agency structures have been formed 
for consultations and discussions.  This is a rather new form of evalua-
tive practice, and the model is still being reviewed to identify the best 
ways of organising inter-agency RTEs.40 
 
With RTEs, it is very important to take into account not only how the 
relationship between the institutions should be, but also the relation-
ship between headquarters level and the field, and between field head-
quarters and regional/ local branches. A study undertaken by Peta 
Sandison (2006) has indicated that operational staff are generally 
more negative to evaluations than are headquarters personnel, because 
of the extra burden they experience, and that they often do not see 
evaluations as being a useful tool for their daily work.  
 
A complicating factor is the fact that institutions differ in the distribu-
tion of decision-making for policy, planning and operational activities. 
While some institutions are highly hierarchical, and require that most 
decisions be endorsed by headquarters, others have decentralised 
structures where most strategic, programmatic and operational deci-
sions are taken in the field. These variations do not necessarily follow 
types of institutions, as there are huge differences among UN agen-
cies, among the various NGOs, and also among diplomatic representa-
tions to what field headquarters can commit to. 
 
Creating dispute mechanisms 
Evaluations should ideally create better-shared understanding of fu-
ture direction of operations and programmes. In practice, however, 
most evaluations will inevitably reveal flaws, failures and mistakes by 
organisations and individuals. Many organisations therefore resist 
joint evaluations, to avoid being exposed to criticism that might harm 
funding and support for ongoing operations. The Rwanda evaluation 
touched upon highly controversial political and policy issues that cre-
ated tension with important stakeholders. The exposure and criticism 
of France’s diplomatic and political dealings with Rwanda in the years 
preceding the genocide led the country to withdraw from the evalua-
                                                 
40  The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is (through OCHA) initiated a study in 
2009 to gather systematic lessons from the previous IA-RTEs.  
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tion. There was also resistance within the UN Secretariat (particularly 
within DPKO) to share documents and information on how the crisis 
had been handled. The UNHCR also strongly opposed some of the 
findings of the team evaluating the humanitarian response. The main 
response of the Steering Comittee of this evaluation was to give prior-
ity to the independence of the evaluators over stakeholder sensitivities. 
At the same time, very high professional standards were demanded 
from the evaluation teams. The controversial issues were included in 
the final report, which contributed to give legitimacy to the findings 
and conclusions.  
 

Conclusions 
Can joint evaluations be of use also in multi- national operations? The 
cases studied have shown that diverse and independent actors can 
benefit greatly from joint evaluations. Such evaluations have facili-
tated the development of common policies and standards, and have 
helped in bringing a range of organisations and institutions into com-
mon learning processes. Whether this can work also in complex 
peacebuilding environments will depend on the ability to elaborate 
common ground rules, and the inclusiveness of the process. Keywords 
are respect for the independence and mandates of the various institu-
tions involved. The more complex the relationship between the actors 
is, the more important a sound management structure will be.  
 
It is difficult to envisage a successful joint evaluation between parties 
that have had no previous relations. Some sort of coordination mecha-
nisms or networks should be there, to underpin a joint evaluation. The 
existence of formal and informal policy and evaluation networks was 
seen to be conducive to reach common grounds and facilitated the se-
lection process and the establishment of joint standards in the selected 
cases. This will be of a greater challenge in situations where also mili-
tary and political actors are prominent, and where comprehensive co-
ordination structures are lacking or of a patchy nature. Joint evalua-
tions should thus be seen as one of several initiatives to improve coor-
dination.  
 
The credibility of evaluations is closely linked to the independence 
and transparency of the evaluation process itself.  The potential parties 
would need to reflect on whether they are prepared to be exposed to 
criticism and scrutiny.  This is a relevant point for all actors, but a par-
ticular issue for military institutions is the degree to which they can 
allow independent evaluators the necessary access to information.  
